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INTRODUCTION
From its biblical1 and constitutional2 roots, American bankruptcy
law has developed to provide significant protection to financially
overextended debtors. In the nineteenth century, Congress
repeatedly responded to national economic difficulty by passing
bankruptcy legislation.' In the last quarter of the twentieth century,
Chapter 11 bankruptcies frequently prevented the disappearance of
major airlines,4 curbing massive employment losses and the resulting
impact on the national economy.' Events of recent years, such as the
proliferation of variable-rate mortgages,6 the large numbers of
layoffs,7 the rising number of individuals without health insurance,8
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1. See Deuteronomy 15:1 ("At the end of every seven years you must cancel debts.").
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 208 (James
Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) ("The power of establishing uniform laws of
bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce ... that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.").
3. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 24 (2001) ("In times of economic crisis, Congress rushed to pass
bankruptcy legislation to alleviate widespread financial turmoil. Once the crisis passed, so
too did the need for a federal bankruptcy law. Like Penelope and her weaving, Congress
quickly undid its handiwork on each occasion, only to start all over again when hard times
returned.").
4. See Christopher Elliott, For Passengers, a Weary Feeling of Bankruptcy Fatigue,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at C4 ("Since the deregulation of the United States airline
industry in 1978, almost two-thirds of the major airlines have landed in bankruptcy court
at least once.").
5. See Mark C. Mathiesen, Bankruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints, and Changes,
61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1044 (1996).
6. See David Leonhardt & Motoko Rich, The Trillion-Dollar Bet: Homeowners Take
Risks in a Bid for Lower Mortgage Payments, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at Cl.
7. Christopher S. Rugaber, New Unemployment Claims Reach 26-Year High, USA
TODAY, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-12-11-jobless_N
.htm.
8. See Julie Appleby, Ranks of Uninsured Americans Grow, USA TODAY, Aug. 30,
2006, at B1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2006-08-29-
health-insurance-coverage.x.htm?POE=NEWISVA.
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and the rapid decline of the stock market in the fall of 2008,9 show the
unpredictable and tenuous nature of the financial health of modern
Americans.
By providing an opportunity for a "discharge"-or a "freeing of
the debtor of all legal responsibility for certain obligations and/or
debts"-the Bankruptcy Code 0 prevents insolvency from becoming a
financial death sentence for individuals who are unable to meet their
debt obligations.1 The primary justification for the discharge of a
bankrupt individual's debts is the concept of the "honest debtor"' 2
who has been unlucky and/or unwise in her financial affairs but
deserves the opportunity to "start afresh."' 3 In addition, bankruptcy
discharges provide benefits to creditors through the orderly
distribution of the debtor's non-exempt assets prior to discharge 4 and
the post-discharge opportunity to conduct business with the
rehabilitated debtor.15 Furthermore, the potential for bankruptcy
protection encourages investment.' 6 On a national level, bankruptcy
provides a safety net to investors who know that the failure of a
business venture will not permanently harm their financial health. 7
9. Ben Steverman, Stock Market Crash: Understanding the Panic, BUS. WK., Oct. 10,
2008, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2008/pi2008109_360708.htm?chan
=rsstopStoriesssi_5.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
11. NORTON DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS § D100 (Hon. William L.
Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton III eds., 2010).
12. See Christopher M. Hogan, Note, Will the Ride-Through Ride Again?, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 882,885-87 (2008) (discussing the "rise" of the "honest debtor").
13. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("One of the primary purposes
of the [B]ankruptcy [A]ct is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.' ") (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236
U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
14. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 158 (1989)
("A primary objective of any bankruptcy process is to regulate the inherent conflicts
among different groups having separate claims against a debtor's assets and income
stream.").
15. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244 ("This purpose of the act has been
again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in
that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.") (emphasis omitted).
16. See K. Matthew Wong, Bankruptcy as a Risk Management Tool: Economic and
Social Implications, 24 REV. BUS. 46,48 (2003).
17. See Sang M. Lee & Suzanne J. Peterson, Culture, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and
Global Competitiveness, 35 J. WORLD Bus. 401, 408 (2000) (discussing the stimulating
effect that liberal bankruptcy laws have on entrepreneurship).
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Despite the benefits of bankruptcy, there is an inherent conflict
of interest between debtors and creditors: creditors want to collect
the money owed by a debtor, while the insolvent debtor, by
definition, cannot satisfy the claims of all his creditors."8 A perception
of debtor dishonesty exacerbates this conflict.19 Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
200520 ("BAPCPA") in response to concerns regarding the abuse of
bankruptcy protection by dishonest debtors.21 BAPCPA primarily
amended the Bankruptcy Code in creditor-friendly ways2 2 and is best
known for its introduction of the "means test"'  in Chapter 7
bankruptcies. 24 The "means test" uses a formula based on a debtor's
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2006) ("The term 'insolvent' means ... financial
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property.").
19. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 890-91 (discussing how the rapid increase in
bankruptcy filings between 1979 and 1997, despite the overall growth of the national
economy, increased the public perception of the dishonesty of bankruptcy debtors).
20. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
21. As he introduced BAPCPA at a Senate hearing, Senator Charles Grassley
commented:
The vast majority of people believe that individuals who file for bankruptcy should
be required to pay back some of their debts if they have the means to do so. This is
precisely what the bankruptcy reform legislation does. Most people think it should
be more difficult for people to file for bankruptcy. Americans have had enough;
they are tired of paying for high rollers who game the current system and its
loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.
Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, Opening Statement of Sen. Charles Grassley at
the Bankruptcy Reform Hearing (Feb. 10, 2005), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel-dataPageID-1502=9716.
When he signed BAPCPA into law President George W. Bush echoed Congress's
concerns about debtor dishonesty. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President
Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), available
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html
("In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked
away from debts even when they had the ability to repay them.").
22. See In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) ("Those responsible for
the passing of the Act did all in their power to avoid the proffered input from sitting
United States Bankruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law at distinguished
universities, and many professional associations filled with the best of the bankruptcy
lawyers in the country as to the perceived flaws in the Act. This is because the parties
pushing the passage of the Act had their own agenda. It was apparently an agenda to
make more money off the backs of the consumers in this country.").
23. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
24. Most consumer, or individual, bankruptcies are either "Chapter 7" or "Chapter
13" proceedings, which are named for the respective chapters of the Bankruptcy Code that
govern their administration. Chapter 7 bankruptcies are "liquidations" where a trustee
distributes a debtor's non-exempt assets to creditors. See NORTON DICTIONARY OF
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assets, liabilities, and demographic information to force some above-
median-income debtors into Chapter 13 proceedings.'
Many observers believed another creditor-friendly aspect of
BAPCPA was the elimination of the "ride-through" option for
personal property in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.26 "Ride-through" 7
occurs when a debtor retains secured personal property during and
after a bankruptcy without "reaffirming" the underlying debt.28 If the
debtor complies with bankruptcy rules and procedures, his debts-
including non-reaffirmed secured debts-are discharged at the end of
his bankruptcy.29 Therefore, after a ride-through the personal-
property creditor can no longer collect the debt from the former
debtor, even though the former debtor still has possession of the
property in question." Nevertheless, the discharge of this debt does
not mean the creditor in a ride-through will necessarily, or even
BANKRUPTCY TERMS, supra note 11, § L70. The "vast majority" of Chapter 7
bankruptcies are "no-asset" cases, Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, A Day in Bankruptcy,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 20, 20, where there are no non-exempt assets to
distribute to creditors.
25. § 707(b). Chapter 13 bankruptcies require a full or partial repayment of debts over
a period of three to five years. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.07[5][e] (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).
26. See In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 351 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) ("[T]he Court finds that
Congress by amending §§ 521 and 362 intended to and was successful in eliminating [ride-
through]...."); In re Kissal, No. 06-10264-SSM, 2006 WL 1868513, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
June 29, 2006) ("Among the many changes to consumer bankruptcy practice made by
[BAPCPA] was the enactment of language that commentators agree was intended to
eliminate ... 'ride-through' for property securing a consumer debt."); Jean Braucher,
Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes, and Other
Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 462 (2005) ("In the 2005
Act, Congress appears to have clarified that there is in general no court-protected ride-
through for cars and other personal property.").
27. "Ride-through" takes its name from the fact that it is most often associated with
the treatment of motor vehicles during a bankruptcy, Coastal Fed. Credit Union v.
Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 171 (E.D.N.C. 2008), and is also known as the "fourth option,"
see Philip R. Principe, Did BAPCPA Eliminate the "Fourth Option" for Individual
Debtors' Secured Personal Property?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 6, 6, and "retain
and pay," see In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *5
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2007). The debtor's three statutory options are reaffirmation,
redemption, and surrender. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006). Ride-through is a "fourth
option" that was judicially recognized through interpretation of the relevant statutes. See
infra Part I.A.
28. When a debtor "reaffirms" a debt he "agrees, in a writing, to remain liable for a
debt that would otherwise be subject to the discharge." COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 25, 1.07[1][i].
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006).
30. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, BAPCPA,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), as recognized in In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539-40
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). During the administration of his bankruptcy, the debtor is
protected from repossession by the "automatic stay." See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
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usually, have to write off the discharged debt as a loss.31 While the
former debtor's personal liability disappears with his discharge, the
lien on his personal property is not eliminated, thus affording the
creditor with a means of recourse.32 If the debtor does not continue
making scheduled payments or maintain insurance, the creditor can
repossess the property under the lien after the conclusion of the
bankruptcy proceeding.33
The opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina in Coastal Federal Credit Union v.
Hardiman34 shows that, while Congress changed some relevant
statutory provisions and limited the availability of the option, ride-
through is not forbidden under the BAPCPA amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. After examining the pre-BAPCPA history of ride-
through, this Recent Development provides an argument in favor of
the district court's decision in Hardiman because ride-through is
consistent with the plain language of the current Bankruptcy Code
and the primary bankruptcy goal of a "fresh start" for an "honest
debtor." In addition, despite their protests to the contrary, creditors'
interests are not significantly harmed by ride-through. Finally, this
Recent Development concludes with an argument that, despite the
Hardiman discussion of the limited nature of the post-BAPCPA ride-
through, the potential to use ride-through is still available in many
Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
I. RIDE-THROUGH AND BAPCPA
A. Ride-Through Before BAPCPA
A debtor's ability to ride-through a bankruptcy developed out of
judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1s the
most recent complete revision of American bankruptcy law.36 While
31. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 377 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The loss of personal liability
does not necessarily mean that creditors are vulnerable.").
32. See Belanger, 962 F.2d at 349. In other words, the debtor's in personam liability is
discharged, but the property's in rem liability is not.
33. Id.
34. 398 B.R. 161 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
35. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. and
elsewhere).
36. See generally John Kevin Poorman, Commentary, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
32 OKLA. L. REv. 583 (1979) (explaining features of the new Bankruptcy Code). While
BAPCPA significantly changed many rules for bankruptcy proceedings, it did so by
amending the 1978 Act rather than completely rewriting the entire Code. H.R. REP. No.
109-31, at 47-155 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 119-212.
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act did not expressly offer debtors the
option of ride-through, courts held that the plain language did not
require a debtor who was not in default on a personal property loan
at the filing of her bankruptcy to reaffirm the debt or "redeem"37 the
property in order to retain it after receiving her discharge.3" Creditors
complained that under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, a Chapter 7
debtor was not even required to give notice of how the property
would be handled during the bankruptcy.39 In 1984, Congress
responded to the complaints of "a coalition of bankers, credit unions,
finance companies, oil companies and retailers" 4 about the treatment
of personal property during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy with the addition
of section 521(2) to the Bankruptcy Code.4'
The first subsection of section 521(2) required debtors to reveal
how they would handle property subject to creditors' liens.42 Section
521(2)(B) provided a forty-five day time limit for the debtor to
perform his intention stated pursuant to section 521(2)(A).43 Section
521(2)(C) also stated, however, that "nothing in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's
rights with regard to such property under this title."'  Interpretation
of section 521(2) led to an almost even split among the United States
Courts of Appeal over the ability of a debtor to ride-through.45 In
37. To "redeem" the property the debtor would pay either the balance of the debt or
the fair market value of the property to the creditor. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 25, 1.07[1][h]. The debtor also has the option of surrendering the property to the
creditor, but would then not have possession of the property after the bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006).
38. See, e.g., In re Perry, 25 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); In re Ballance, 33
B.R. 89, 91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
39. In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990), affid, 962 F.2d 345 (4th
Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), as
recognized in In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539-40 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
40. Belanger, 118 BR. at 370.
41. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1988), amended by BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat 23 (2005).
42. § 521(2)(A) (1988) ("[W]ithin thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition
under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever
is earlier, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes,
the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention
or surrender of such property [securing debt] and, if applicable, specifying that such
property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that
the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property.").
43. § 521(2)(B) (1988).
44. § 521(2)(C) (1988).
45. Five circuits recognized the ride-through option. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379
(3d Cir. 2004); In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43,
51 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992) superseded by
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ride-through circuits, section 521(2)(A) was read to impose a notice
requirement only and not to affect a debtor's substantive options with
regard to the property.46 The Fourth Circuit noted that "[tihe phrase
'if applicable' [in section 521(2)(A)] is redundant if ... the options
given to the debtor are considered to be exclusive."47 Nevertheless,
several circuits held the options to be exclusive and required debtors
to reaffirm or redeem debts in order to prevent repossession of
secured personal property.48 It is important to note that even in the
circuits that did not allow the option of ride-through to the debtor,
"[r]ide-through by creditor acquiescence [was] common."49 While the
United States Supreme Court never settled the circuit split on ride-
through, ° many observers believed that BAPCPA did.5
B. Ride-Through After BAPCPA: A Statutory Survival Story
Interpreting the various "confusing, overlapping, and sometimes
self-contradictory" BAPCPA changes related to ride-through "is like
trying to solve a Rubik's Cube that arrived with a manufacturer's
defect. ' 52 The first step to determine whether ride-through survived
the BAPCPA amendments is to look at the changes to section 521.53
At first glance, the initial subsections of section 521 relevant to ride-
statute, BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), as recognized in In re Donald,
343 B.R. 524, 539-40 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d
1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989). Five circuits limited debtors to the statutory options. See In re
Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 849 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383,
1387 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1054-55, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. See, e.g., Price, 370 F.3d at 379; Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; Belanger, 118 B.R. at
372.
47. Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348.
48. See, e.g., Burr, 160 F.3d at 849; Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1387.
49. Braucher, supra note 26, at 462-63. If the debtor is not allowed to ride-through,
refuses to reaffirm, and cannot or will not redeem the property, the creditor's only options
are to take the property and forego any future payments on the debt or to allow an
informal ride-through. See id. at 476 (discussing the "painful choice" of creditors in non-
ride-through circuits between reclaiming the property or collecting full payments,
including interest).
50. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 171 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
51. See In re Rowe, 342 BR. 341, 351 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Kissal, No. 06-
10264-SSM, 2006 WL 1868513, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 26, 2006); Braucher, supra
note 26, at 462.
52. In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). Similar criticism can be
leveled at the entirety of the BAPCPA amendments, which are an example "of what can
go wrong when an interest group uses its muscle to pass a complex piece of legislation
without a careful, expert drafting process." Braucher, supra note 26, at 457.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
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through look identical to the pre-BAPCPA versions; 4 however, as
one continues to read this section, important changes appear. Section
521(a)(2)(C) still states that "nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with
regard to such property under this title," but Congress added a
caveat: "except as provided in section 362(h). '55 In addition, there is
an entirely new subsection, section 521(a)(6), which also discusses the
debtor's obligations with regard to secured debts.56
After section 521(a)(7), there is a new, unnumbered paragraph
that explicitly gives creditors recourse to "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" if the debtor fails to comply with section 521(a)(6).57 The
amended section 521 provides two new hurdles for a debtor who
wants to ride-through: (1) the completely new section 521(a)(6) (in
conjunction with the new unnumbered paragraph after section
521(a)(7)), and (2) the "except as provided in section 362(h)" caveat
in section 521(a)(2)(C). 58
Section 521(a)(6) and the unnumbered paragraph appear to
forbid ride-through. The debtor cannot retain personal property
unless he either "enters into [a reaffirmation] agreement with the
54. The minor changes to the initial subsections of section 521 include numeration
changes (so former section 521(A)(2) is now section 521(a)(2)(A)), additional duties for
the debtor (and, by extension, his attorney) in section 521(a)(1), deletion of the word
"consumer" before "debts which are secured by property of the estate" in section
521(a)(2), and a change in the time limit for the debtor to perform his stated intention
from forty-five to thirty days in section 521(a)(2)(B). See § 521. While these changes are of
concern to practicing bankruptcy attorneys, they do not answer the question of the status
of ride-through.
55. § 521(a).
56. Id. ("[I]n a case under chapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an individual,
[the debtor shall] not retain possession of personal property as to which a creditor has an
allowed claim for the purchase price secured in whole or in part by an interest in such
personal property unless the debtor, not later than 45 days after the first meeting of
creditors under section 341(a), either: (A) enters into an agreement with the creditor
pursuant to section 524(c) with respect to the claim secured by such property; or (B)
redeems such property from the security interest pursuant to section 722.").
57. Id. ("If the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period referred to in paragraph
(6), the stay under section 362(a) is terminated with respect to the personal property of the
estate or of the debtor which is affected, such property shall no longer be property of the
estate, and the creditor may take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by
applicable nonbankruptcy law, unless the court determines on the motion of the trustee
filed before the expiration of such 45-day period, and after notice and a hearing, that such
property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate, orders appropriate adequate
protection of the creditor's interest, and orders the debtor to deliver any collateral in the
debtor's possession to the trustee.").
58. Id.; Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 172-73 (E.D.N.C.
2008).
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creditor" or redeems the property.59 The new unnumbered paragraph
expressly states that if the debtor fails to exercise one of these non-
ride-through options he will lose the protection of the automatic stay
regarding the property, and the creditor will be free to exercise his
nonbankruptcy remedies, presumably including repossession. 60
Nevertheless, statutory construction involves more than a
superficial reading of a statute. Courts use the "plain meaning rule"
and " 'consider the context in which the statutory words are used
because [courts] do not construe statutory phrases in isolation;
[courts] read statutes as a whole.' ,61 An important aspect of section
521(a)(6) under plain meaning analysis is the inclusion of two
bankruptcy terms of art: "allowed claim" and "purchase price. ' '62 For
a claim to be "allowed," a creditor must file a "proof of claim" with
the bankruptcy court.63 Creditors generally do not file proofs of claim
in no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 64 In addition, the "allowed claim"
must be for the "purchase price" and "[a] plain meaning construction
... indicates a claim for the full purchase price. "65 Thus, section
59. § 521(a)(6).
60. § 521(a); Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 173. While this author endorses the majority of
the ride-through analysis in Hardiman, one flaw in the reasoning is Judge Dever's
repeated conclusion that the creditor's nonbankruptcy options include repossession and a
deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of the debt. See id. at 173-74, 176. The
unnumbered paragraph at the end of section 521(a) terminates the automatic stay "with
respect to the personal property of the estate or of the debtor which is affected" and
allows the creditor to "take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by
applicable nonbankruptcy law." § 521(a). This paragraph does not allow the creditor to
take action toward the debtor during the bankruptcy. See id. As a result, unless the debtor
executes a reaffirmation agreement or the bankruptcy court issues an order excepting this
particular debt from discharge, the debtor's pre-petition debts, including secured debts
treated as ride-through and secured property surrendered to or repossessed by the
creditor, are discharged at the close of his bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2006)
("Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this
section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for
relief under this chapter .. "); see also In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 231 (Bankr. D. Utah
2007) ("If the Court rejects the reaffirmation agreement, Debtor will not be liable for any
deficiency in the event that Debtor defaults under the contract and the vehicle is
repossessed."); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An
Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 719 (1999) ("[W]hile a Chapter
7 debtor's personal liability will be discharged, a secured creditor will retain its lien on the
collateral.").
61. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 167 (quoting Ayes v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 473
F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006)).
62. § 521(a)(6).
63. In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 536 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
64. Id. Generally, creditors do not have a reason to file proofs of claim in no-asset
bankruptcies because there are no assets to distribute.
65. Id. (relying on the definition of "purchase price" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1235 (6th ed. 1990) and Congress's use of different terms, such as "purchase money
2258 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
521(a)(6) is not applicable unless the secured creditor files a proof of
claim, which creditors rarely do in no-asset cases, and the claim is for
the full purchase price of the property, which could only occur if the
debtor had made no payments on the debt prior to filing
bankruptcy.'
While the relevant changes to section 521 appear to only bar
ride-through in a small percentage of Chapter 7 bankruptcies, section
362(h) has more general applicability. Section 362(h)67 provides
security interest" and "any portion of the purchase price," to indicate less than the full
purchase price in other areas of the Bankruptcy Code).
66. Id. at 537-38. These interpretations, reading section 521(a)(6) as limited to claims
for the full purchase price and requiring filed proofs of claim, are plausible. Congress
might have wanted to bar the ride-through option for debtors who are presumably abusing
the Bankruptcy Code by filing a petition immediately after purchasing property secured
by a lien, prior to making any payments. See In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 229 (Bankr. D.
Utah 2007). Similarly, requiring a filed proof of claim provides the court with
documentation of the amount and validity of the claim as well as details about the
contractual agreement between the parties, such as the existence of an ipso facto clause.
Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 179; see infra note 92 (discussing ipso facto clauses). In Hardiman,
the credit union did not file a proof of claim or have a claim for the full purchase price, so
section 521(a)(6) did not apply. In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS
4648, at *10 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2007).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2006). Section 362(h) states:
(1) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, the stay provided by subsection
(a) is terminated with respect to personal property of the estate or of the debtor
securing in whole or in part a claim, or subject to an unexpired lease, and such
personal property shall no longer be property of the estate if the debtor fails
within the applicable time set by section 521(a)(2):
(A) to file timely any statement of intention required under section 521(a)(2)
with respect to such personal property or to indicate in such statement that
the debtor will either surrender such personal property or retain it and, if
retaining such personal property, either redeem such personal property
pursuant to section 722, enter into an agreement of the kind specified in
section 524(c) applicable to the debt secured by such personal property, or
assume such unexpired lease pursuant to section 36 5(p) if the trustee does
not do so, as applicable; and
(B) to take timely the action specified in such statement, as it may be
amended before expiration of the period for taking action, unless such
statement specifies the debtor's intention to reaffirm such debt on the
original contract terms and the creditor refuses to agree to the reaffirmation
on such terms.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the court determines, on the motion of the
trustee filed before the expiration of the applicable time set by section 521(a)(2),
after notice and a hearing, that such personal property is of consequential value
or benefit to the estate, and orders appropriate adequate protection of the
creditor's interest, and orders the debtor to deliver any collateral in the debtor's
possession to the trustee. If the court does not so determine, the stay provided by
subsection (a) shall terminate upon the conclusion of the hearing on the motion.
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exceptions to the general bar of abrogation of the debtor's rights by
the requirements of sections 521(a)(2)(A) and (B). 61 This section is
not limited to "allowed claims" for the full "purchase price,"'69 but
instead applies to "personal property of the estate or of the debtor
securing in whole or in part a claim."7 Paragraph A requires the
debtor to indicate his intention to either surrender or retain the
property.7 If he intends to retain, he must redeem, "enter into an
agreement of the kind specified in section 524(c)," or assume a
lease. Paragraph B requires the debtor to perform his announced
intention.73 Ride-through is not one of the debtor's listed options
here: the debtor must surrender, redeem, assume, or "enter into an
agreement of the kind specified in section 524(c). 74 What exactly
does it mean, then, to "enter into an agreement of the kind specified
in section 524(c)"?
Section 524(c) 75 lists requirements for valid reaffirmation
agreements.76 Some of these requirements differ based on whether
68. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
69. § 521(a)(6).
70. § 362(h).
71. § 362(h)(1)(A).
72. Id.
73. § 362(h)(1)(B). While section 362(h) appears to require the debtor to perform one
of the listed options for her secured property and the options do not include ride-through,
paragraph B also apparently includes one way for ride-through to occur: the debtor does
not have to perform his intention if it was to reaffirm the debt on the original contract
terms and the creditor refuses to reaffirm. Id.; see In re Hoisington, 383 B.R. 369, 372
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2008) (indicating ride-through would be appropriate where the debtor
indicates intention to reaffirm and the creditor refuses, but refusing to allow ride-through
where the debtor's intention was "retain and pay" and the creditor refused to reaffirm).
This exception would not apply to the Hardimans, whose creditor did agree to
reaffirmation. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161,166 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
74. § 362(h)(1)(A).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
76. Id. This section provides:
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for
which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under
this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if:
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under section
727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title;
(2) the debtor received the disclosures described in subsection (k) at or before the
time at which the debtor signed the agreement;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable, accompanied
by a declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor during
the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states that:
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the debtor was "represented by an attorney during the course of
negotiating an agreement under this subsection."77 If an attorney
assists the debtor with the agreement, section 524(c) calls for his
certification that, among other things, the reaffirmation will not
impose an "undue hardship" on the debtor.78 If the debtor is not
represented by an attorney during his negotiations with the creditor,
the court must approve the agreement for it to be valid.79 The court
should approve the agreement if it is not an "undue hardship" and it
is in the debtor's "best interest. 80
II. HARDIMAN: POST-BAPCPA RIDE-THROUGH IN ACTION
In Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman,a the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina was asked to
interpret the effect of the BAPCPA amendments on ride-through
where a reaffirmation agreement by an unrepresented debtor was
rejected by the bankruptcy court.82 When the Hardimans filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 2, 2007, they owned a 2005 Chevrolet
(A) such agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by
the debtor;
(B) such agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor; and
(C) the attorney fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and consequences
of:
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in this subsection; and
(ii) any default under such an agreement
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge or
within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs
later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney
during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court
approves such agreement as:
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a
consumer debt secured by real property.
77. Id.
78. § 524(c)(3)(B).
79. § 524(c)(6)(A).
80. Id. It is worth noting that neither "undue hardship" nor "best interest" is defined
in the statute.
81. 398 B.R. 161(E.D.N.C. 2008).
82. See Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161,165 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
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Equinox.83 This vehicle was valued at approximately $9,000 and
burdened by a lien in favor of Coastal Federal Credit Union. 84 The
regular monthly payments on the Equinox loan were $479.69 and
approximately $20,000 was outstanding when the Hardimans filed
bankruptcy." The Hardimans sought to keep their vehicle and
entered into a reaffirmation agreement with the credit union.'
Since the Hardimans were not represented by an attorney in the
negotiation of their reaffirmation agreement, the bankruptcy court
was required to approve the agreement as not imposing an undue
hardship and as being in the debtors' best interest.87 While the
reaffirmation agreement indicated that the Hardimans had $1,390
available in their budget to pay the monthly car payment of $479.69,
their initial Chapter 7 filings indicated a deficit in their monthly
budget of $1,200.88 The Hardimans told the bankruptcy judge, Judge
Small, that, although it might be difficult at times, they thought they
could make the payments required by the reaffirmation agreement.89
In addition, the court considered the relatively large discrepancy
between the fair market value of the car, approximately $9,000, and
the remaining balance of the loan that was to be reaffirmed,
approximately $20,000. 90 Judge Small decided not to approve the
reaffirmation, finding it was an "undue hardship" and not in the
debtors' best interest "[b]ecause of the uncertainty of the debtors'
ability to pay and the size of the potential deficiency." 91
The credit union believed that the failure of the reaffirmation
agreement would result in the termination of the automatic stay and
allow repossession of the Hardimans' vehicle under the "ipso facto"
clause in their loan agreement. 92 Coastal Federal argued that the
83. Id. at 165-66.
84. Id. at 165.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 166.
87. Id.
88. In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *3-4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Nov. 20,2007).
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *3-4.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id. at *11-12. An ipso facto clause declares the borrower to be in default on a loan
if he files for bankruptcy protection. See Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R.
161, 165-66 (E.D.N.C. 2008). Prior to BAPCPA, ipso facto clauses were unenforceable in
the Fourth Circuit as contrary to the bankruptcy goal of a fresh start for debtors. See Riggs
Nat'l Bank v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1984). BAPCPA added section 521(d),
which states that if a debtor "fails timely to take the action specified" in sections 521(a)(6)
or 362(h):
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Hardimans were required to reaffirm the debt to avoid the operation
of section 521(d), and since the bankruptcy court refused to approve
the reaffirmation, the debtors had failed to "take the action specified"
and the ipso facto clause was enforceable.93 Coastal Federal also
claimed the bankruptcy court could not allow the Hardimans to ride-
through because that option had been eliminated by BAPCPA.94 In
response, the Hardimans argued that sections 521(a)(2) and 362(h)
only required them to "enter into an agreement," which they had
done.95 The bankruptcy court agreed with the debtors, pointing out
that "[t]he Code does not require the debtors to enter into a
reaffirmation agreement and obtain court approval in order to
comply with §§ 521(a) and 362(h). 96 Therefore, the bankruptcy court
held that the automatic stay remained in place, the credit union could
not invoke the ipso facto clause, and, as a result, a more limited
version of ride-through survived the BAPCPA changes to the
Bankruptcy Code.97
Coastal Federal challenged this ruling on appeal to the district
court by arguing for exceptions to the plain meaning rule.98 Coastal
Federal asked Judge Dever of the district court to reject the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code provisions at issue because the
results of the ruling were "absurd" and contrary to congressional
intent for the application of the BAPCPA amendments.99 While the
nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the operation of a provision in the
underlying lease or agreement that has the effect of placing the debtor in default
under such lease or agreement by reason of the occurrence, pendency, or existence
of a proceeding under this title or the insolvency of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 521(d) (2006). So, after BAPCPA, if a debtor "fails timely to take the action
specified" regarding his secured personal property, the ipso facto clause would be
enforceable. In re Hardiman, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *11 (quoting § 521(d)).
93. In re Hardiman, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *11-12 (quoting § 521(d)).
94. Id. at *5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *12.
97. Id. at *13, 18.
98. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 167 (E.D.N.C. 2008). By
challenging the plain meaning of the BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
Coastal Federal took the ironic position of arguing against the wording of a piece of
legislation that was initially written by creditor representatives, see Braucher, supra note
26, at 457, and heavily influenced by creditor lobbyists, see generally Susan Jensen, A
Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005,79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).
99. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 167. Although Coastal Federal argued that the bankruptcy
court's statutory interpretation was incorrect, see Appeal Brief for Appellant Coastal
Federal Credit Union at 6, Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161
(E.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 5:08-cv-00017-D) (arguing that the bankruptcy court's interpretation
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plain meaning rule is the "cardinal canon" of statutory construction
and "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there, '""°° there are "two
narrow exceptions" known as the "absurd[ity]" exception and the
"intent" exception. 1 For the absurdity exception to apply, the results
of the plain meaning analysis "must be so gross as to shock the
general moral or common sense."'" The intent exception applies "in
rare cases [where] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' 1 3 In
Hardiman, Judge Dever acknowledged the existence of these
exceptions as well as their limited applicability.t"
Coastal Federal argued that Congress generally intended to
eliminate ride-through in BAPCPA and sought exceptions to the
plain meaning rule in various areas of Judge Small's statutory
interpretation.0  Judge Dever had little trouble discarding Coastal
Federal's absurdity exception arguments as insufficient to overcome
the presumption in favor of the statute's plain language 10 6 because "it
is not [the] court's role to determine whether Congress could have
done a better job in drafting BAPCPA" when the plain language
result is "plausible."'0 7
Nevertheless, the district court also had to deal with the
creditor's intent exception arguments, which appeared to have strong
of "entering into an agreement" pursuant to § 524(c) was "hyper-technical"), Judge
Dever's opinion treated these arguments as pleas for exceptions to the plain meaning
interpretation. See Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 167.
100. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253-54 (1992).
101. In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257,265 (4th Cir. 2004).
102. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); see also United States v. Kirby, 74
U.S. 482, 486 (1868) (holding that a statute forbidding willful obstruction of a mail carrier
did not apply when the mail carrier had been indicted for murder even though there was
no express exception in the statute).
103. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); see also Scurto v. Le
Blanc, 184 So. 167, 174 (La. 1938) (concluding that a statute allowing impeachment of a
witness "in any unlawful way" was a scrivener's error and that the legislature intended for
impeachment to be lawful).
104. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 167-69.
105. Id. at 178-88.
106. See id. at 179 (concluding that requiring claims to be filed with the bankruptcy
court is not absurd due to the possible congressional purposes of obtaining proof of an
ipso facto clause and the existence of an enforceable lien); id. at 180 (stating that limiting
applicability of section 521(a)(6) to full purchase price is not absurd because it could
"apply as written to curb the most abusive of bankruptcy practices: buying personal
property on credit by taking advantage of a 'no money down, no payments for X days'
offer, enjoying the personal property while making no payments whatsoever, and then
filing for bankruptcy immediately before repossession").
107. Id. at 184.
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support in the legislative history of BAPCPA. While it is plausible
that Congress intended to limit the applicability of section 521(a)(6)
to deter the most flagrant abusers of bankruptcy protection, the
legislative history of BAPCPA indicates otherwise.0 8 House Report
31 states that BAPCPA "amends section 521(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that an individual who is a chapter 7 debtor may not
retain possession of personal property securing, in whole or in part, a
purchase money security interest." 109 This language appears to
contradict those who interpret "purchase price" to mean the full
purchase price. 10
Judge Dever's first argument against using the intent exception
here-questioning if the quoted portion of House Report 31 actually
"contravenes" the language of the statute because "all claims for the
full purchase price will involve a purchase money security
interest"" '-is not entirely convincing because the "in whole or in
part" language of House Report 31 does appear to directly contradict
the conclusion that "purchase price" means full purchase price. Judge
Dever then pointed out that House Report 31 shows that Congress
knew how to indicate a claim for less than the whole purchase price
but did not do so in section 521(a)(6); thus rejecting the intent
exception argument, Judge Dever re-emphasized the heavy burden
carried by those seeking to overcome the plain language of a
statute.11 2 To further support this conclusion, Judge Dever could have
pointed out that the quoted portion of House Report 31 does not
reference section 521(a)(6) specifically. 1 3 The language from House
Report 31 could be in reference to section 521(a)(2), which refers to
"debts which are secured by property" without mentioning the
"purchase price." '114
Coastal Federal also challenged the bankruptcy court's
conclusion that the credit union cannot use the ipso facto clause
108. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 70-71 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 139.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
111. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 180-81. Judge Dever appears to have ignored the "in
whole or in part" language and focused instead on the use of "purchase money security
interest," another term of art in the Bankruptcy Code that does not require claims to be
for the full purchase price. See In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 536-37 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
While Judge Dever was correct that a claim for the full purchase price would involve a
purchase money security interest, a purchase money security interest securing a debt "in
part" would not be for the full purchase price.
112. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 181.
113. The House Report references section 521(a) without indicating specific
subsections. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 70.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
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under section 521(d) to repossess the vehicle under the intent
exception. 115 House Report 31 states that BAPCPA "terminates the
automatic stay with respect to personal property if the debtor does
not timely reaffirm the underlying obligation or redeem the
property., 116 Nevertheless, Judge Dever pointed out that House
Report 31 does not go into as great detail as the statute in discussing
the specific operation of the BAPCPA amendments on an
unrepresented debtor."7  He read the legislative history as
emphasizing the duty of the debtor to enter into a reaffirmation
agreement and concluded that the intent argument did not overcome
the substantial judicial deference given to the plain language of the
statute.11
8
Overall, the court determined that "Coastal attempt[ed] to mix
the absurdity exception, the intent exception, and the circumstances
surrounding BAPCPA's passage to concoct a 'this is what Congress
really should have done' exception to the plain meaning rule [even
though] [t]here is no such exception.""' 9 Even if Coastal Federal's
position was more sympathetically described as supporting a "this is
what it occasionally seems Congress wanted to do" exception or a
weak intent exception argument, it was not "the most extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions from [legislative history that] would
justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning' of the statutory
language."' 20 In addition, another general intent of BAPCPA was to
limit judicial discretion, which encourages reliance on the plain
language of BAPCPA's provisions.'
III. THE POTENTIAL OF POST-BAPCPA RIDE-THROUGH
The facts of Hardiman show that ride-through can benefit both
debtors and creditors and that the doctrine is more available post-
BAPCPA than many observers believe. For the Hardimans, the
practical result of Judge Dever's opinion was that they were allowed
to retain possession of their car without personally guaranteeing the
115. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 187.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 17.
117. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 187-88.
118. Id. at 188.
119. Id.
120. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984).
121. See Musselman v. Ecast Settlement Corp., 394 B.R. 801, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008)
(rejecting a creditor's argument against the plain language of "projected disposable
income" in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) because Congress "also sought to impose objective
standards on Chapter 13 determinations, thereby removing a degree of judicial flexibility
in bankruptcy proceedings").
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loan.2 While they were obligated to continue making regular
payments on the loan to maintain possession, Coastal Federal's
remedy in the event of a default was limited to repossession of the
vehicle."2 Allowing the Hardimans to keep their vehicle while freeing
them from the threat of a significant deficiency judgment is consistent
with the bankruptcy goal of a "fresh start."'' 24 An insolvent debtor's
release from personal liability for an automobile loan provides relief
from stress with a psychological "fresh start."'25 Further, if the
Hardimans and other insolvent debtors were forced to reaffirm and
become liable for the deficiency, they could conceivably be in a worse
economic position post-discharge because of the Bankruptcy Code's
limitations on filing a future bankruptcy. 126 Their "fresh start" would
thus lead to a dead end.
Moreover, ride-through does not significantly harm the creditor
in most situations. While Coastal Federal lost the ability to pursue a
deficiency judgment against the Hardimans personally, ride-through
allows the creditor to collect more than the value of the vehicle,
which would not be possible if the credit union invoked the ipso facto
clause and repossessed the vehicle. 127 Ride-through also provides an
intangible benefit to the credit union from the discharge of the
Hardimans' unsecured debts in their bankruptcy. 128 Since the
bankruptcy discharge reduces their overall monthly debt payments
and frees up additional money for the car payment, the Hardimans'
"gain in creditworthiness may more than offset the creditor's loss of
122. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 188.
123. Id. The Hardimans also have to continue to meet other obligations under the lien
(such as maintaining insurance) to retain possession. Id.
124. See In re Wilhelm, 369 B.R. 882, 883 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007) ("Reaffirmation
agreements are generally not favored by courts as they are contrary to one of the primary
goals of the Bankruptcy Code: to provide a debtor with a fresh start.").
125. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 95 (1990) ("The
[humanitarian theory of bankruptcy discharge] focuses on the need to recognize and
facilitate the intrinsic self-worth of the individual debtor, a self-worth severely undermined
by oppressive debt obligations.").
126. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006) (forbidding a Chapter 7 discharge for a
debtor who received a discharge within the previous eight years).
127. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 923. Moreover, even in cases where the debtor has
decided to reaffirm, it is possible for the creditor to collect less money than it would have
been paid through ride-through. See, e.g., In re Eiler, No. 07-26168, 2008 WL 2074043, at
*5 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 14, 2008) (holding that a creditor cannot collect arrearages due
to error in a reaffirmation agreement, resulting in the creditor collecting less money
through reaffirmation than would have been paid through ride-through).
128. See Braucher, supra note 26, at 476.
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recourse against the debtor personally after discharge., 129 Also, in
subsequent ride-through situations Coastal Federal will be able to
avoid the significant costs of reaffirmation 3 ° and the costs related to
litigating the issue in Hardiman. While any creditor understandably
would like the added security of the ability to collect (and threaten to
collect) a deficiency personally through a reaffirmation agreement, a
creditor's position is not significantly weakened by ride-through.
In some instances, the creditor's position is arguably improved by
ride-through. This is the case, like in Hardiman, where the alternative
to ride-through is an ipso facto clause repossession of a vehicle for
which the loan balance is significantly greater than the fair market
value of the vehicle. 31 If the district court had allowed Coastal
Federal to repossess the Hardimans' vehicle after rejecting the
reaffirmation agreement, the credit union would not have been able
to pursue a personal deficiency. 32 Ride-through enabled Coastal
Federal to potentially collect over $20,000 from the Hardimans, while
repossession would have likely resulted in a collection of $9,000 or
less for the credit union. Thus, a post-BAPCPA ride-through option
would benefit debtors and, at a minimum, not significantly harm
creditor interests.
While Judges Dever and Small emphasized the limited nature of
the new ride-through in their opinions,"' on close examination and
viewed in conjunction with related rulings by other courts, the new
ride-through is not as limited as it may initially appear. The
requirements for the new ride-through are: (1) an unrepresented
debtor; (2) who attempts to reaffirm his personal property loan; (3)
129. Id.
130. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 923 (discussing the increased costs of reaffirmation
under BAPCPA).
131. The Hardimans owed approximately $20,000 on their Equinox, which was valued
at about $9,000. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 165 (E.D.N.C.
2008). In this type of situation involving an "upside-down" loan, the creditor generally
does not want to invoke the ipso facto clause and repossess because of the potential for a
far larger total payment under the loan. The creditor simply wants to use the ipso facto
clause to threaten the debtor with repossession and encourage him to reaffirm. See
Culhane & White, supra note 60, at 742 (discussing how some debtors' attorneys,
"knowing that the lender does not really want to repossess," fail to act on proposed
reaffirmation agreements).
132. See In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 231 (Bankr. D. Utah); Culhane & White, supra
note 60, at 719.
133. See Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 186 (describing post-BAPCPA ride-through as "a
modified version of the fourth option that applies to certain uncounseled debtors in
certain cases"); In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *18
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2007) ("While 'ride-through' is not a stand-alone option ... it
may, in limited circumstances, occur as a result of a debtor's attempt to reaffirm.").
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but is thwarted by a court that finds that the reaffirmation is an
"undue hardship" and/or is not in the debtor's best interest.' At first
blush, these requirements appear to eliminate the majority of debtors.
Most debtors file bankruptcy with the assistance of counsel.'35
Similarly, how often will reaffirming a loan that will allow a debtor to
keep possession of a family vehicle be judged an "undue hardship"?
Upon closer examination, however, these requirements are not
as limited as they appear. To take advantage of the Hardiman ride-
through option, a debtor need not lack representation for her entire
bankruptcy; her attorney simply cannot help her negotiate the
reaffirmation agreement. 3 6 A debtor's attorney can represent her
client in all aspects of the bankruptcy case other than the negotiation
of the reaffirmation agreement and the debtor will still be considered
"unrepresented" for the purposes of ride-through.'37 The Hardimans
had the assistance of counsel in their initial bankruptcy filing,'38 in
their reaffirmation hearing in the bankruptcy court, 39 and on appeal
to the district court.14° So, the potential to be an "unrepresented"
debtor for purposes of the ride-through is available to all debtors.
The Hardiman ride-through may also be available to debtors
who are represented in their reaffirmation negotiations. In In re
134. See Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 165-67.
135. Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA Bankruptcy
Filings, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2008, at 14, 14, available at http://www.justice.gov/
ust/eo/public affairs/articles/docs/2008/abi_200808.pdf (reporting that less than six percent
of 2007 Chapter 7 filings were pro se).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (2006); In re Roberts, 154 B.R. 967, 969 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1993) ("Reaffirmation hearings are not required as a condition to the enforceability
of a reaffirmation agreement unless.., the debtor is not represented by counsel .... ).
137. See § 524(c)(6)(A) ("[Iln a case concerning an individual who was not represented
by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection ... .
138. In re Hardiman, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *2-3.
139. Id. at *3.
140. See Supplemental Appeal Brief for Appellee at 9, Coastal Fed. Credit Union v.
Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 5:08-cv-00017-D). While the legal strategy
of not having the debtor's attorney participate in reaffirmation negotiations worked in
Hardiman and was apparently not questioned by the bankruptcy or district courts, this
strategy is not without risks. At least one bankruptcy court has sanctioned the debtor's
attorney for failing to participate in reaffirmation negotiations on behalf of his client. See
In re DeSantis, 395 B.R. 162, 167-72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). Debtors' attorneys planning
to attempt a Hardiman ride-through, especially those in the Middle District of Florida,
would be advised to delete the reference to assisting their clients with reaffirmation
agreements from their standard client contracts and explain to the court their reasons for
refusing to participate in negotiations. See id. at 165-66 ("The Law Firm never explained
why the debtors would choose to represent themselves in these somewhat questionable
and difficult reaffirmation negotiations when the debtors already had paid the Law Firm
for this service.").
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Donald,' where the argument that was ultimately successful in
Hardiman was previously made, there was some question whether the
debtors were represented in the reaffirmation negotiations, but the
court assumed they were not because neither party pressed the
issue. 42 Nevertheless, In re Donald stated generally that, "if the
reaffirmation agreement does not contain the attorney's certification,
the agreement is not enforceable unless there is also a motion for
court approval, in which case a hearing will be scheduled."' 43 At this
hearing the debtors will have the opportunity to argue against
approval of their reaffirmation as the Hardimans did. t" In addition,
after BAPCPA the Bankruptcy Code requires the court to review any
reaffirmation agreement that does not show sufficient income to
make the required payments, regardless of the debtor's
representation.'45 Therefore, in light of related bankruptcy court
rulings, the limitation of the Hardiman ride-through to unrepresented
debtors does not exclude many debtors, regardless of the status of
their counsel.
Similarly, the requirements that the reaffirmation agreement
represent an "undue hardship" and not be in the debtor's best
interest may appear difficult to meet, but are not in practice. In
Hardiman, the reaffirmation agreement was rejected even though the
agreement showed plenty of available money for the payments, and
the debtors testified that they thought they could afford the
payments. 46 Convincing a bankruptcy court that a reaffirmation is an
unnecessary burden is easier if the alternative is a ride-through.'47 If a
ride-through will be allowed after the reaffirmation agreement is
rejected, the bankruptcy judge must decide which alternative is better
141. 343 B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
142. See Donald, 343 B.R. at 527.
143. Id.; accord In re Mendoza, 347 B.R. 34, 41 n.13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) ("The
lack of a[n attorney's] signature is the equivalent of the debtor being unrepresented.").
144. In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *3 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Nov. 20,2007).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(m) ("[Ilt shall be presumed that such agreement is an undue
hardship on the debtor if the debtor's monthly income less the debtor's monthly expenses
as shown on the debtor's completed and signed statement in support of such agreement
... is less than the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt."); In re Laynas, 345 B.R.
505,512 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2006) ("Now, under new § 524(m)(1), courts must review and
decide whether to disapprove an agreement in which a presumption of undue hardship
arises, regardless whether the debtor's counsel participated in the formation of the
reaffirmation agreement or properly counseled the debtor about the potential benefits and
pitfalls of reaffirmation.").
146. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161,166 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
147. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 919 n.273. This argument was also made to the court
in Donald. See Donald, 343 B.R. at 526.
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for the debtor.148 The judge will be faced with two alternatives that
will likely differ in only one respect: if the reaffirmation is approved,
the debtor will have personal liability to the creditor, and if the
agreement is not approved, he will not. Under either outcome, the
debtor will continue paying the creditor on the same or similar terms
as the original agreement and retain possession of the secured
property. 149 Requiring a debtor to personally guarantee a debt to
receive the same benefits he would receive without the personal
guarantee is "undue hardship," at least in the "unnecessary" sense.
Nevertheless, even if the judge believes a reaffirmation would not
qualify as an "undue hardship," the second half of the test, where the
judge must certify that the agreement is in the best interests of the
debtor, 5 ° should lead to the rejection of the reaffirmation. This
standard does not look at the interests of the creditor at all, and it is
"[c]ertainly ... in the best interest of the Debtor to be free from
liability on a deficiency in the event that the vehicle is repossessed
and sold for a deficiency." '151 Therefore, the "limited" ride-through
available after the BAPCPA amendments in Hardiman is not
necessarily as limited as it may appear.152 The Bankruptcy Code
requires court approval of reaffirmation agreements when the debtor
is unrepresented in negotiations, 3 the debtor's attorney refuses to
sign the agreement, 54 or the reaffirmation agreement does not show
148. See In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) ("For purposes of
determining whether approval of the reaffirmation agreement is in the best interest of the
Debtor, the Court will examine, from the Debtor's point of view, whether the Debtor is
better off with the reaffirmation agreement approved or denied by the Court.").
149. A creditor's ability to demand better reaffirmation terms than were in the original
loan agreement is limited by a debtor's statutory right to avoid performing his intention to
reaffirm if the creditor refuses to reaffirm on the same terms as the original loan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(h)(1)(B).
150. Id. § 524(c)(6)(A)(ii).
151. Blakeley, 363 B.R. at 231.
152. In addition to the Hardiman ride-through, there are other ways to ride-through
under the current Bankruptcy Code. A creditor may allow a ride-through even if it is not
required. See Braucher, supra note 26, at 462-63. An unwise creditor could refuse to
reaffirm on the original contract terms. See § 362(h)(1)(B). The failure of a creditor to
provide the debtor with the statutorily required notices can result in a ride-through. See In
re Quintero, No. 06-40163, 2006 WL 1351623, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006). A
creditor's acceptance of payments without a reaffirmation can be construed as a waiver of
the right to oppose ride-through. See Braucher, supra note 26, at 477. Finally, a
reaffirmation agreement might not be signed or filed prior to the debtor's discharge. See
Decision and Order Regarding Reaffirmation Agreement at *1, In re Herrera, 2007 WL
4411258 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007). Thus, it seems fair to say that the demise of ride-
through under BAPCPA has been greatly exaggerated.
153. § 524(c)(6)(A).
154. In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
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income sufficient to pay the debt."'5 If the court subsequently
determines that the debtor may have trouble making the payments
required by the reaffirmation agreement or a default would result in a
significant deficiency, the court should disapprove the agreement and
allow ride-through.'56
CONCLUSION
In Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman, the opinion of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina concluded that the ride-through option for personal
property in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy had not been completely
removed from the Bankruptcy Code by the BAPCPA amendments.
15 7
Hardiman endorses a limited ride-through option when the
bankruptcy court finds a reaffirmation agreement is not in an
unrepresented debtor's best interest and/or is an undue hardship. In
addition, the Hardiman ride-through appears to be available to
represented debtors and a strong argument can be made that it will
always be in the debtor's best interest. The relationship of ride-
through to a debtor's "fresh start," the lack of significant harm to
creditors, and the imprecise drafting of the BAPCPA amendments
may lead to more wide-spread availability of the "limited" option
discussed in Hardiman. While post-BAPCPA ride-through may not
be available to all debtors, the potential for this debtor-friendly
option should be examined by bankruptcy practitioners prior to
advising their clients to resume liability for personal property debts. 58
CHRISTOPHER McGOWAN BADGER
155. § 524(m).
156. In re Hardiman, No. 07-00954-5-ATS, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4648, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Nov. 20,2007).
157. See Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161,165 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
158. No circuit court has ruled on the viability of post-BAPCPA ride-through in a
situation similar to that in Hardiman. In a case decided January 11, 2010, a Fourth Circuit
panel acknowledged the recognition by some courts of the type of ride-through used by
the Hardimans, but had "no occasion to address the 'back door ride-through'" since the
debtor did not attempt to reaffirm. See In re Jones, 591 F.3d 308, 312 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010).
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